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SWALLOWING ITS OWN TAIL: THE CIRCULAR GRAMMAR OF
BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES UNDER LUCAS
Gregory M. Stein*
INTRODUCTION
The exception to the rule the United States Supreme Court established
in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council1 undercuts that rule more
than the Court probably anticipated, as Professor Michael C. Blumm and
Ms. Rachel G. Wolfard persuasively demonstrate in a recent article.2 And
Lucas effectively upheld earlier case law that it claimed to modify,3 as
Professor Robert L. Glicksman persuasively shows in his response to
their article.4 This Article will not take issue with those authors’
conclusions but will carry their analysis one step further. It argues that
the “background principles” exception that Lucas claims to have
recognized is, for purely linguistic reasons, not an exception to the rule
of that case.5 Justice Kennedy alluded to this fact in his Lucas
concurrence, remarking on the “inherent . . . circularity” of the Court’s
analysis.6 Professor Glicksman recognizes this circularity and states,
even in his title, that the exception swallows the rule.7 The Lucas Court’s
discussion goes beyond circularity, however, effectively swallowing its
own tail. It sets forth a rule that at best contains two clauses that are
redundant and at worst intrinsically incorporates its own inconsistent
exception.
Lucas holds that a regulation that deprives a landowner of all
economically viable use of its land is a taking per se unless “the
proscribed use interests were not part of [the owner’s] title to begin
* Woolf, McClane, Bright, Allen & Carpenter Distinguished Professor of Law,
University of Tennessee College of Law, gstein@utk.edu. My thanks to Michael C. Blumm,
Rachel G. Wolfard, and Robert L. Glicksman.
1. See 505 U.S. 1003, 1027–30 (1992).
2. Michael C. Blumm & Rachel G. Wolfard, Revisiting Background Principles in Takings
Litigation, 71 FLA. L. REV. 1165, 1174–81 (2019).
3. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1023–24 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (“‘Harmful or
noxious use’ analysis was . . . simply the progenitor of our more contemporary statements that
‘land-use regulation does not effect a taking if it “substantially advance[s] legitimate state
interests” . . . .’”).
4. Robert L. Glicksman, Swallowing the Rule: The Lucas Background Principles
Exception to Takings Liability, 71 FLA. L. REV. F. 121, 126–37 (2020).
5. The Court refers to its exception as “background principles,” see, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S.
at 1031 (“South Carolina must identify background principles of nuisance and property law that
prohibit the uses [Lucas] now intends in the circumstances in which the property is presently
found.”), while one of the dissenters calls it the “nuisance exception,” see, e.g., id. at 1067
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (labelling a section of the dissenting opinion “The Nuisance Exception”).
This Article uses the terms interchangeably.
6. Id. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
7. Glicksman, supra note 4, at 121.
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with.”8 This Article will make three grammatical arguments to
demonstrate that the Court’s exception is actually an essential ingredient
of the main rule, and a partially contradictory one at that. First, the socalled exception is not an exception because it assumes an owner can be
deprived of something it never had. Second, a categorical rule from which
a large proportion of cases is excluded is, by definition, not categorical.9
Finally, Lucas demands that a court answer two questions, but the
“logically antecedent inquiry” that the Court describes cannot be
undertaken beforehand and must be addressed concurrently.10 Once we
put these three linguistic failings together, it becomes evident that the rule
of Lucas is self-contradictory.
One might argue that the three shortcomings of the opinion just
described are nothing more than different facets of a single inconsistency
in the rule the Court established. One also might argue that proof of the
first point moots the second one. This Article will not dispute either of
these arguments. But because the Lucas Court treats these three topics
separately, this Article will respond to them sequentially rather than
making the plausible argument that they can be collapsed into one.
I. THE NUISANCE EXCEPTION IS NOT AN EXCEPTION
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council purported to create a single
categorical rule along with a single exception. The Court stated both
succinctly, holding, “Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that
deprives land of all economically beneficial use, we think it may resist
compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of
the owner’s estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part
of his title to begin with.”11 This means that a tribunal first must assess
whether a regulation deprived the plaintiff of all economically beneficial
use of its land.12 If the regulation did not, then Lucas is inapplicable,
while if it did, then the plaintiff is entitled to compensation unless the
proscribed use interests did not belong to the plaintiff in the first place.13
The juxtaposition of these two components of the Lucas test highlights
the opinion’s first internal incongruity, for it is not possible to be
constitutionally deprived of something one never owned.
8. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027 (footnote omitted).
9. Glicksman, supra note 4, at 136 (footnote omitted) (“These expansive conceptions of
the scope of the background principles exception go a long way toward explaining why the socalled exception has ‘swallowed’ the categorical rule.”).
10. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027.
11. Id. (footnote omitted).
12. The opinion is somewhat unclear as to what “all” means, with the Court suggesting that
the value of an owner’s property must drop by more than 95%. Id. at 1019 n.8. For purposes of
this Article, the distinction between “all” and “substantially all” is immaterial.
13. Id. at 1027; see also Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 548 (2005)
(reaffirming Lucas in a unanimous opinion).
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The Oxford English Dictionary defines “deprive” to mean, “To divest,
strip, . . . dispossess of . . . a possession,” and notes that “to deprive (a
person) of (a thing) = to take it away from him.”14 A secondary definition
adds, “To keep (a person) out of . . . what he would otherwise have; to
debar . . . .”15 Similarly, “deprivation” means “the taking away of
anything enjoyed; dispossession, loss” and “dispossession, deposition.”16
Real estate lawyers are well acquainted with this sort of terminology. This
language presupposes that the object of which an owner is being deprived
is something that previously belonged to that owner; indeed, it would be
nonsensical to state that an owner is constitutionally entitled to just
compensation for being deprived of something it did not previously
own.17
If deprivation means dispossession or divestment, then the second half
of the Lucas test becomes meaningless. For if proscribed use interests
were not part of an owner’s title to begin with, then that owner has been
deprived of nothing: An owner cannot be divested of property rights that
were not vested in that owner or dispossessed of property rights the owner
never possessed.18 The owner may not hold a given property right in the
end, but it has not lost that right.19 If the government prevents me from
occupying my home, I have been deprived of my occupancy rights, but if
the government prevents me from occupying my neighbor’s home, I have

14. Deprived, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) (emphasis omitted).
15. Id.
16. Deprivation, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989).
17. Note also that regulators have learned since Lucas to include safety valves in land use
regulations that allow them to grant variances to owners who might otherwise suffer a Lucas
taking. In fact, South Carolina unsuccessfully attempted to do this as the Lucas case was
proceeding, but the Court ruled that the state acted too late. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1010–14
(describing these subsequent amendments to the state law and holding that Lucas did not have to
pursue the newly created procedure for obtaining a special permit). In the most extreme cases,
then, the government body can weigh the benefits of the regulation against the potential
compensation costs and make an individualized determination about how to proceed.
18. See Blumm & Wolfard, supra note 2, at 1206 (footnote omitted) (“No takings claimant
has a right to government compensation absent a showing that its claimed property right is in fact
a verifiable and vested one.”); Glicksman, supra note 4, at 126 (referring to “the alacrity with
which the courts have identified background principles in statutory or regulatory sources, and the
broad diversity of those sources”); see also id. at 135 (concluding that “although Lucas may have
clarified the nature of the threshold inquiry into the presence or absence of a protected property
right capable of being taken, it did not invent the inquiry”).
19. Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background
Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 321, 365 (2005) (footnote
omitted) (“To abandon this threshold inquiry would imply that a takings claimant could prevail
on the merits without a protected property right, an implication at odds with over a century of
American takings jurisprudence.”).
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not been deprived of anything.20 In the second case, the Lucas exception
introduces no substance that is not already incorporated into the test itself.
The proscribed use—occupancy of my neighbor’s home—was never part
of my title to begin with, but the Court does not need the second prong of
the test to reject my claim. The Court practically concedes this point,
when it notes that “[a] law or decree with such an effect must . . . do no
more than duplicate the result that could have been achieved in the
courts . . . under the State’s law of private nuisance . . . .”21
To be fair, contemporary American dictionaries place less emphasis
on the removal of something formerly possessed. The MacMillan
Dictionary definition, for instance, states, “if you deprive someone of
something, you take it away from them or prevent them from having it.”22
The latter half of this definition does not appear to assume that the party
claiming a deprivation previously held the interest in question. Under this
meaning, a person who is homeless is deprived of shelter even if they
never had any. While modern American usage of the word “deprive” may
not automatically import the idea that the interest must be something
previously possessed, an opinion using this word when resolving a
regulatory takings case can mean nothing else.23 The Fifth Amendment’s
Takings Clause prohibits “private property” from being
“taken . . . without just compensation,”24 and a private property right can
be taken only from the owner of that right.25
The Takings Clause applies to all takings and not just the narrow
subset of “deprivation of all economically feasible use”26 takings that
David Lucas claimed to have suffered. Professor Blumm and Ms.
Wolfard show in considerable detail that lower courts have applied the
background principles exception in other takings cases in which the
plaintiff cannot meet that portion of the Lucas test.27 The fact that the
20. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436 (1982) (noting
that “an owner suffers a special kind of injury when a stranger directly invades and occupies the
owner’s property”).
21. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
22. Deprive,
MACMILLAN
DICTIONARY,
https://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/deprive
(U.S.
version)
[https://perma.cc/2QV2-63ZU].
23. See Glicksman, supra note 4, at 136 (highlighting that “unless the plaintiff has an
interest capable of being taken, no taking is possible”).
24. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
25. See, e.g., United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17, 20 (1958) (“Dow can prevail only if the
‘taking’ occurred while he was the owner.”); see also Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271,
284 (1939) (footnote omitted) (finding that “the owner at [the time of the taking], not the owner
at an earlier or later date, receives the payment”).
26. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7.
27. Blumm & Wolfard, supra note 2, at 1170 (“[A]ll takings claims are premised on the
alleged governmental taking of private property, and background principles define the nature of
a landowner’s legitimate property interests.”).
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Lucas nuisance exception has been expanded to these non-Lucas settings
further buttresses the conclusion that the exception is actually an integral
component of takings law itself and not just an exception to a rule: A
plaintiff cannot be deprived of something it never owned whether the
plaintiff claims a total deprivation or some other type of taking. In nonLucas settings, too, the government is not required to compensate a party
that has not been deprived of constitutionally protected property rights.28
Thus, background principles inherently limit all takings, not just total
takings.
In cases of permanent physical occupation, the government’s action is
different in kind.29 In these cases, the government or its agent is
physically occupying property and is doing so perpetually, two types of
infringement that David Lucas never claimed to have suffered.30 But even
in cases exhibiting these more intrusive government actions, the
government need not pay compensation unless it has deprived the
plaintiff of something, as Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp. held.31 Jean Loretto recovered because her right to use, exclude
others from, and dispose of a small amount of space on her rooftop had
been taken from her perpetually, but if she had never enjoyed these rights,
she would not have recovered.32 Once again, the exception adds nothing
that was not already implicit in the main test.
28. See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 548 (2005).
29. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436 (1982) (explaining
that “an occupation is qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use of property”).
30. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1006–09 (1992) (describing the facts of
the case).
31. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441; see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028–29 (“[W]e assuredly would
permit the government to assert a permanent easement that was a pre-existing limitation upon the
landowner’s title.”); Blumm & Wolfard, supra note 2, at 1206 (“[A]n inquiry into background
principles is the antecedent inquiry concerning alleged physical invasions . . . .”).
32. Although the Court did not emphasize the point, Ms. Loretto bought her building after
the cable company placed its equipment on the roof, which should have raised the question of
whether she was the correct party to bring the claim. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 421–24 (describing the
facts of the case). While Palazzolo v. Rhode Island subsequently held that a claimant’s acquisition
of property after an alleged taking occurred is not a complete bar to her claim, 533 U.S. 606, 629–
30 (2001) (commenting that “a regulation that otherwise would be unconstitutional absent
compensation is not transformed into a background principle of the State’s law by mere virtue of
the passage of title”), one could argue that only her predecessor was deprived of anything and
possessed a viable takings claim, see supra note 25, a fact that she should have factored into the
amount she paid for the property. This is all the more true in cases alleging permanent physical
occupations, since in those cases the infringement is accomplished in its entirety during the prior
owner’s period of ownership. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 628 (“[W]hen a State has physically
invaded the property without filing suit, the fact and extent of the taking are known. In such an
instance, it is a general rule of the law of eminent domain that any award goes to the owner at the
time of the taking . . . .”). By contrast, regulatory takings often ripen over an extended period of
time, during which title may have changed hands. Id. at 626–27 (describing the effect of notice
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If an alleged taking does not fall within the categorical rules of Loretto
or Lucas, then a court must fall back on the multi-factor test set forth in
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York.33 Under Penn
Central, a court is tasked with examining several standards, some of
which it has not fleshed out satisfactorily.34 But under those standards,
too, a court cannot find a taking of a property right that the plaintiff never
owned, as Professor Blumm and Ms. Wolfard demonstrate.35 This
expansion of the Lucas exception to non-Lucas takings since 1992 causes
no harm but also adds nothing, since it is inherent in the meaning of the
words “deprive” and “taken.” It merely illustrates the Court’s unstated
recognition that a government action cannot constitutionally deprive a
party of a property right that party never held.
II. THE CATEGORICAL RULE IS NOT CATEGORICAL
The Lucas Court refers to its holding as a categorical rule, meaning
that any landowner who fits within the category the case recognizes wins
automatically, no matter the government’s justification for the
infringement.36 Rather than looking at facts and circumstances and
weighing different elements against one another, as Penn Central
requires courts to do for other types of regulatory takings, a court that
believes a property owner has shoehorned itself into the narrow Lucas
category must award compensation.37 This feature of the opinion
supposedly makes the rule easier to apply and is one that the dissenters
criticize heavily.38
The Court immediately backtracks from this categorical rule,
recognizing that the state nonetheless “may resist compensation . . . if the
logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner’s estate shows

on owners claiming a regulatory taking); see generally Gregory M. Stein, The Effect of Palazzolo
v. Rhode Island on the Role of Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations, in TAKING SIDES ON
TAKINGS ISSUES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PERSPECTIVES 41 (Thomas E. Roberts ed., 2002)
(describing the interplay between ripeness rules and substantive law in regulatory takings cases).
33. 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (describing the Court’s “ad hoc, factual inquiries”).
34. Id.
35. Blumm & Wolfard, supra note 2, at 1206 (observing that “an inquiry into background
principles is the antecedent inquiry concerning . . . Penn Central regulatory takings”).
36. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 (finding “categorical treatment appropriate . . . where regulation
denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land” and noting that this is true “without
case-specific inquiry into the public interest advanced in support of the restraint”).
37. Id. at 1026 (referring to “our categorical rule that total regulatory takings must be
compensated”).
38. See, e.g., id. at 1071 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (decrying that “‘fairness and justice’ are
often disserved by categorical rules”).
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that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin with.”39
The parties, just informed that there are no defenses to a specific category
of actions, are promptly told that there are, with the majority and a
concurring Justice squabbling over just how expansive these defenses
are.40
This feature of Lucas is particularly ironic given the Court’s insistence
that it was replacing its earlier “noxious use” test because that standard is
too easy for legislatures to manipulate.41 The Court feared that under the
old rule, legislatures could fabricate justifications in all or most cases,
which means that “logic cannot serve as a touchstone to distinguish
regulatory ‘takings’—which require compensation—from regulatory
deprivations that do not require compensation.”42 Its new categorical rule
is supposed to sidestep the possibility of such legislative misbehavior,
because a plaintiff’s facts either fit into the requisite category or they do
not.
However, as one of the dissenters notes, “The Court . . . fails to explain
how its proposed common-law alternative escapes the same trap.”43 For,
“[a]s the Court admits, whether the owner has been deprived of all
economic value of his property will depend on how ‘property’ is
defined.”44 The Court claims to be replacing a standard with a rule, but
the new rule incorporates a new standard.45 This new standard “will
ordinarily entail (as the application of state nuisance law ordinarily
entails) analysis of, among other things, the degree of harm to public
lands and resources, or adjacent private property, posed by the claimant’s
39. Id. at 1027 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 1036 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating
that “the Court . . . creates simultaneously a new categorical rule and an exception”); id. at 1067
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (arguing that “the categorical rule established in this
case is only ‘categorical’ for a page or two in the U.S. Reports. No sooner does the Court state
that ‘total regulatory takings must be compensated,’ than it quickly establishes an exception to
that rule”).
40. Compare id. at 1029 (acceptable background principles must “do no more than
duplicate the result that could have been achieved in the courts . . . under the State’s law of private
nuisance”), with id. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I agree with the Court
that nuisance prevention accords with the most common expectations of property owners who
face regulation, but I do not believe this can be the sole source of state authority to impose severe
restrictions.”).
41. Id. at 1025 n.12 (“Since such a justification can be formulated in practically every case,
this amounts to a test of whether the legislature has a stupid staff. We think the Takings Clause
requires courts to do more than insist upon artful harm-preventing characterizations.”).
42. Id. at 1026.
43. Id. at 1053 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Blumm & Wolfard, supra note 2, at
1206 (footnote omitted) (“The background principles defense resembles the old categorical
government nuisance-prevention defense, which the Lucas majority rejected.”).
44. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1054 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
45. See Richard J. Lazarus, Putting the Correct “Spin” on Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1411,
1426 (1993) (referring to this as “a shell game” and calling the two “analytical equivalent[s]”).

2021]

SWALLOWING ITS OWN TAIL

253

proposed activities.”46 This approach is just as subjective as the one it
replaced, if not identical to it.47 The ostensibly categorical rule is not
categorical.
III. THE “LOGICALLY ANTECEDENT” INQUIRY IS NOT ANTECEDENT
As already noted, Lucas requires courts to ascertain both whether
there has been a deprivation of all economically viable use and whether
the property interests allegedly lost were part of the owner’s property
rights to begin with.48 The Court’s phrasing of this test suggests that a
trier of fact must make the first finding first and proceed to the second
inquiry only if it answers the first one affirmatively. There is no need to
waste judicial resources elucidating what interests the plaintiff began
with if the court or administrative agency concludes that the government
did not deprive that owner of all economically viable use of those
interests.49
A court or administrative agency may initially view the first question
as easier to answer than the second one. If the plaintiff retains property
rights of significant value even after the alleged deprivation, then the
court may conclude the plaintiff has not suffered a total taking and need
not move on to the difficult question of property rights that follows. But
this first finding cannot be determinative, because diminution in value is
a fraction, and the trier cannot accurately assess whether the plaintiff has
been deprived of all of its economic value without also determining what
that initial value was.50 As an administrative matter, the court can address
either of these questions first but cannot resolve the case until it has
answered both of them and compared the two numbers. The issue for the
court is, “How large is the fraction?” It does not matter whether the court
establishes its numerator or denominator first.
The grammatical implication that a court should apply the first clause
before the second is undercut by the Supreme Court’s reference to the

46. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030–31 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 826, 827 (AM.
L. INST. (1986))).
47. See Lazarus, supra note 45, at 1419 (“[T]he Court bent over backwards to draft an
opinion that seemed wholly favorable to the landowner, while in fact rejecting much, if not all, of
his legal theory.”).
48. See supra Part I.
49. While this statement is true in the “total taking” cases that Lucas addresses, the fact that
courts apply the nuisance exception to other types of alleged takings may make it necessary to
undertake this inquiry in those cases. See supra notes 27–35 and accompanying text.
50. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 498 (1987), illustrates
this point vividly. The Court there concluded that the petitioners had lost the ability to mine 27
million tons of coal but held for the respondent anyway, because this represented “less than 2%
of petitioners’ coal.” Id. The numerator was huge, but the denominator was more than fifty times
larger.

254

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW FORUM

[Vol. 71

second part of its test as “logically antecedent.”51 Perhaps the test would
read more smoothly if it were phrased the other way around: A trier of
fact first must determine what interests a property owner started with
before it can decide whether the state has rendered those interests
economically valueless.52 Reversing the clauses, though, still does not
change the fact that one cannot evaluate the magnitude of a fraction
without knowing both its components.53
Justice Kennedy, seemingly alone among the Justices in the majority,
acknowledged this point.54 He noted that any attempt to answer the
question whether a government entity has taken property demands an
investigation into the owner’s “reasonable, investment-backed
expectations.”55 But the analysis of whether the owner has lost everything
begs the question of what the owner began with:

51. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027; see also Blumm & Wolfard, supra note 2, at 1203 (“This
survey of recent case law reveals that background principles remain a critical first inquiry that
takings claimants must successfully hurdle to succeed in takings cases.”).
52. See Glicksman, supra note 4, at 131 (“[T]he analysis of the applicability of the
background principles exception precedes rather than follows an inquiry into whether a regulation
results in an economic wipeout.”).
53. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 419 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“If we
are to consider the value of the coal kept in place by the restriction, we should compare it with the
value of all other parts of the land. That is, with the value not of the coal alone, but with the value
of the whole property.”); see also id. (“[T]he value of the coal kept in place by the restriction may
be negligible as compared with the value of the whole property, or even as compared with that
part of it which is represented by the coal remaining in place and which may be extracted despite
the statute.”).
54. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1033–34 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Scalia’s
opinion for the Court was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, O’Connor, and
Thomas. Id. at 1005. Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment, providing a sixth vote for the
outcome, but none of the other five Justices in the majority joined Justice Kennedy’s concurrence.
Id. at 1032.
55. Id. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The finding of no value must
be considered under the Takings Clause by reference to the owner’s reasonable, investmentbacked expectations.”). This phrasing began to develop fourteen years earlier, in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124–25 (1978) (“[T]his Court has
dismissed ‘taking’ challenges on the ground that, while the challenged government action caused
economic harm, it did not interfere with interests that were sufficiently bound up with the
reasonable expectations of the claimant to constitute ‘property’ for Fifth Amendment purposes”),
and has become a touchstone of the Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence. See Lingle v.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538–39 (2005) (endorsing this test unanimously and citing
Penn Central); see also Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633 (O’Connor, J., concurring):
Our polestar . . . remains the principles set forth in Penn Central itself and our
other cases that govern partial regulatory takings. Under these cases,
interference with investment-backed expectations is one of a number of
factors that a court must examine. Further, the regulatory regime in place at
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There is an inherent tendency towards circularity in this
synthesis, of course; for if the owner’s reasonable
expectations are shaped by what courts allow as a proper
exercise of governmental authority, property tends to
become what courts say it is. Some circularity must be
tolerated in these matters, however, as it is in other spheres.56
Lucas requires a trier of fact to ascertain both the numerator and the
denominator of a fraction and then compare their relative sizes. In
determining both these numbers, the trier is calculating the magnitude of
the loss the regulation caused. As a practical matter, a court may decide
that it makes the most sense to determine whether a plaintiff possesses a
protected property interest before deciding whether the government has
taken that interest. But unless the plaintiff possesses no property interest
at all, the court cannot finally resolve the dispute until it has undertaken
both halves of the inquiry. The two constituents of the fraction are
essential to this determination, which means that neither one is
“antecedent” to the other.
CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to demonstrate that the nuisance exception
is not an exception, the categorical rule is not categorical, and the
logically antecedent inquiry is not antecedent. To a large extent, the three
clauses of the previous sentence make similar points in three different
ways. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s confusion is not surprising, given
the difficulty of the issue raised in Lucas. That issue is whether the
application of a new South Carolina statute took the landowner’s property
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.57 Because
this was a claim of a regulatory taking, the Court was forced to assess
whether the state law went “too far,” as described in the Court’s prior
regulatory takings jurisprudence.58
The Court can hardly be faulted for the problems it has faced in
devising useful rules to guide property owners, government regulators,
and lower courts.59 The issue is a challenging one that the language of the
the time the claimant acquires the property at issue helps to shape the
reasonableness of those expectations.
Id.
56. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
57. Id. at 1007.
58. See, e.g., id. at 1014 (“[W]hile property may be regulated to a certain extent, if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.” (quoting Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 415)).
59. See, e.g., Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124 (citation omitted) (“[T]his Court, quite simply,
has been unable to develop any ‘set formula’ for determining when ‘justice and fairness’ require
that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government . . . .”).
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Takings Clause does not specifically address,60 regulatory takings cases
are highly fact-specific,61 and the Court has been attempting to triangulate
an answer for well over a century.62 While it is reasonable to expect the
Supreme Court to address difficult issues clearly and fairly, it is also
understandable when unanticipated facts that arise in subsequent cases
demonstrate the shortcomings of and questions left unaddressed in its
earlier holdings. Lower courts often must fill in these gaps.
That seems to be what has happened in the years following Lucas, as
Professor Blumm and Ms. Wolfard demonstrate.63 At the time of the
decision, prognosticators on both sides of the issues attempted to forecast
where the Court’s holding would lead. Now, with the benefit of nearly
three decades of hindsight, it is possible to analyze Lucas’s consequences
with ample case law to support one’s conclusions, as these authors have
done. The categorical rule of Lucas has offered increased certainty to
owners, regulators, and lawyers but, ironically, not in the manner the
Court’s majority anticipated.
Lucas ostensibly replaces a malleable standard with a more crystalline
rule, one that legislatures and regulatory bodies were supposed to have a
harder time manipulating. That new rule, however, is subject to an
exception that is just as flexible as the prior standard and, in fact, similar
to it in many ways. The exception turns out to be an inherent feature of
the rule, neither of which makes any grammatical sense without the other,
and the new rule is no more categorical than the older standard it was
designed to supplant. In addition, since the magnitude of a loss can be
examined only after determining the magnitude of the original property
interest, neither inquiry is antecedent, and certainly not “logically
antecedent,” to the other.
What the years since Lucas have shown, as Professor Blumm and Ms.
Wolfard and then Professor Glicksman demonstrate, is that Lucas marked
much less of a doctrinal transformation than its authors probably intended
60. One set of commentators has described “[t]he attempt to distinguish ‘regulation’ from
‘taking’ [as] the most haunting jurisprudential problem in the field of contemporary land-use
law—one that . . . may be the lawyer’s equivalent of the physicist’s hunt for the quark.” CHARLES
M. HAAR & MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF, LAND-USE PLANNING: A CASEBOOK ON THE USE, MISUSE,
AND RE-USE OF URBAN LAND 875 (4th ed. 1989).
61. See, e.g., MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 348 (1986)
(citation omitted) (“A court cannot determine whether a regulation has gone ‘too far’ unless it
knows how far the regulation goes.”).
62. The Court’s difficulties with this issue date back at least to Mugler v. Kansas. See 123
U.S. 623, 668–69 (1887) (“A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are
declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the community,
cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for the public
benefit.”).
63. See, e.g., Blumm & Wolfard, supra note 2, at 1182 (summarizing the expansion of the
concept of background principles since Lucas was decided).
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and much less than some commentators at the time foresaw. Justice
Blackmun feared that the Court had “launche[d] a missile to kill a
mouse”64 and authored a dissent “not because I can intercept the Court’s
missile, or save the targeted mouse, but because I hope perhaps to limit
the collateral damage.”65 He need not have worried, as it turns out,
because the Court’s missile sailed harmlessly into the Atlantic, just off
the picturesque Charleston coast.

64. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1036 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 1036–37.

